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D
uring the past decade, a number of East and
Central European countries have stabilized
their economies, built up the institutions and the
legal underpinnings of a market economy, and
achieved sustained economic growth.  In these
c o u n t r i e s, the conduct and objectives of macro e c o-
nomic policy have evo l ved rapidly during this time.
Initially, monetary authorities used direct instru-
ments such as credit ceilings and focused on easily
understood and highly visible targets such as the
nominal exchange rate.  As a measure of macro-
economic stabilization was achieved, and with the
emergence of the necessary markets and institu-
tions, monetary policy has evolved toward less
d i rect instruments such as open-market opera t i o n s
and toward new targets such as reducing inﬂation
to West European levels.
In this paper, we examine the experience of
t h ree of the more successful transition economies,
the Czech Re p u b l i c, Hungary, and Poland.  These
countries' economic perfo r m a n c e s, whether
m e a s u red by the level of inﬂation or by the re s u m p-
tion of economic growth after the initial shock of
t ransition, places them at the fo re f ront of the tra n s i-
tion economies.  They will be among the ﬁrst East
E u ropean countries to join the European Union (EU).
Indeed, it may appear that their economies are, to a
l a rge extent, post-transition economies whose policy
o b j e c t i ves and problems are much more like those of
the advanced and middle-income market economies
of Europe than those of the successor states of the
former Soviet Union.  Their experience in achiev i n g
this status provides valuable lessons for those tra n s i-
tion economies that have, as yet, to develop their
m a r kets and their monetary institutions to the same
extent as have these three countries. 
A key policy objective for the three tra n s i t i o n
economies considered in this paper is to reduce their
i n ﬂation rates to levels that prevail in the EU.  To this
end, they are seeking new approaches to ﬁg h t i n g
i n ﬂation, with the Czech Republic and Poland fo r -
mally adopting inﬂation ta rgeting as their moneta r y
p o l i cy re g i m e.  Inﬂation ta rgeting, howeve r, like other
m o n e tary policy regimes that seek to inﬂu e n c e
prices without re c o u rse to price contro l s, re q u i res a
functioning capital market to serve as a mechanism
for the transmission of monetary policy.  We exa m i n e
the efforts to develop such markets in these coun-
tries in the next section.  In the fo l l owing section, we
examine the evolution of monetary policy in each
c o u n t r y, highlight the problems that moneta r y
authorities have faced, and describe the curre n t
a p p roach to managing inﬂation. 
CREATING A BANKING SYSTEM
A key component of the transition in each of the
t h ree countries was to create a functioning capita l
m a r ket, which, in the case of the Czech Republic and
Poland, re q u i red the creation of a two-tier banking
s ystem out of the former socialist state bank.  The
socialist banking system consisted of a state bank
that not only performed the functions of a centra l
bank, but also issued virtually all short-term cre d i t s
to the country’s enterprise secto r.  There we re also
s eve ral subsidiary banks with specialized functions
such as ﬁnancing fo reign trade or servicing house-
holds’ savings accounts.  Credit was granted not on
the basis of the cre d i t worthiness of the ﬁrms seeking
loans but rather on the need to ﬁnance activities
d e c reed by the central plan. 
The Czech Republic
In Cze c h o s l ovakia, the socialist central bank wa s
b ro ken up into a two-tier banking system shortly
after the fall of the communist re g i m e.  The loan
p o r t folio of the former central bank was inherited
mainly by the largest of the new commercial banks,
Ko m e rc ˘ní Banka, in the Czech Re p u b l i c, and
Vs ˘eobecná Úve rová Banka in the Slovak Re p u b l i c.
Other commercial banks emerged from the fo r m e r
s p e c i a l i zed banks (Desai, 1996, p. 469).  Because of
the federal structure of Cze c h o s l ovakia, most of the
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c o m m e rcial banks carved out from the socialist-era
c e n t ral bank and from the specialized banks concen-
t rated their activities in one Republic or the other.
T h u s, in 1993, when Cze c h o s l ovakia split into two
independent countries, the Czech Republic and the
S l ovak Re p u b l i c, the number of active banks in each
successor country declined, and each country had to
found its own central bank on the basis of the fo r m e r
C ze c h o s l ovak National Bank.  In the Czech Re p u b l i c,
the Czech National Bank (CNB) was established and
g i ven the traditional functions of a central bank. 
C zech commercial banks held many bad loans
that had been made to sta t e - owned ﬁrms during the
socialist period. Because Ko m e rc ˘ní Banka had the
biggest share of these loans, its nonperforming loan
p roblem was the most serious, and it re c e i ved the
bulk of the funds that the government allocated to
aiding the commercial banks.  Some of the wo rs t
loans we re tra n s f e r red to the Consolidation Bank,
which was founded precisely to manage such loans.
P r i va t i zation had a major impact on the Cze c h
banking secto r.  Shares of the commercial banks
we re auctioned to the public through the vo u c h e r
p r i va t i zation, but the government remained the pri-
mary owner of each of the major banks.  Pe r h a p s
m o re important was the fact that each commerc i a l
bank set up one or more investment priva t i za t i o n
f u n d s, which collected the vo u c h e rs held by citize n s
i n to a mutual fund that used these vo u c h e rs to bid
for shares of companies undergoing priva t i za t i o n .
Because about two - t h i rds of all available vo u c h e rs
went to such investment funds, the banks became
major ow n e rs of Czech industrial ﬁrms and—second
only to the controlling shares held by the gove r n m e n t
—of each other.  Banks have shown a proclivity to
m a ke loans to unpro ﬁtable ﬁrms in which their
i n vestment funds hold large sta ke s.  The dominant
role of the government in the ow n e rship of the
banks has raised questions about the efﬁc i e n cy with
which bank credit is allocated by the banking
s ys t e m .1 As a result of these ow n e rship ties betwe e n
banks and ﬁr m s, the withdrawal of banks fro m
lending to the business sector in favor of lending to
the government has been less of a problem in the
C zech Republic than it was in Hungary. 
The unwillingness of the Czech government to
a l l ow fo reign banks to enter the market has
compounded the lack of competition caused by the
banks’ ow n e rship of enterprises and by the domina-
tion of the market by a few large banks.  New l y
founded domestic banks have been too small, sub-
ject to disadva n tageous regulation and plagued by
scandal.  A number have failed, had their license
revo ked, or been ta ken over by the large sta t e - ow n e d
c o m m e rcial banks (Desai, 1996, pp.479-480).
Although commercial banks have been re q u i red to
i n c rease their capita l i zation over time, aided by CNB
policies that maintain high spreads between lending
and borrowing ra t e s, the ﬁnancial situation of the
c o m m e rcial banks has not improved as much as
hoped due to their continued lending to insolve n t
c l i e n t s.  Many observe rs believe that it will be difﬁc u l t
for the government to ﬁnd fo reign inve s to rs to ta ke
over its majority shares in Czech commercial banks. 
Hungary
In Hungary, the state bank was tra n s formed into
a two-tier banking system in 1987, prior to the
beginning of the transition, as part of ongoing effo r t s
to decentra l i ze the economy and to replace the plan
with indirect state control over economic activity.
The new banking system consisted of the National
Bank of Hungary (NBH), which re tained the functions
of a traditional central bank, and ﬁve new l y -
o rg a n i zed commercial banks.  The commerc i a l
banks inherited some of the staff of the former sta t e
bank as well as the state bank’s loans to sta t e - ow n e d
ﬁr m s.  Three of the newly created commercial banks
had country-wide secto ral mandates:  Budapest Bank
in industry, Magyar Hitel Bank in agriculture and
Ke re z kedelmi Bank in coopera t i ve s, small businesses,
and public utilities.  The sta t e - owned commerc i a l
banks started life underc a p i ta l i zed, with shaky loan
p o r t folios and with few incentives to compete with
each other, to behave efﬁciently or even to scre e n
against making bad loans (Bartlett, 1997, pp. 77-79;
10 3 - 108).  Neve r t h e l e s s, this early experience with a
t wo-tier banking system provided important human
and institutional capital for formulating and carrying
out monetary policy during the subsequent
t ransition period. 
The ability of ﬁrms to service their loans fro m
Hungarian commercial banks deteriorated at the
outset of the transition because Hungarian ﬁrms suf-
f e red ﬁnancial losses when their exports to the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) dis-
a p p e a red virtually overnight even as domestic
1 For an analysis of Komerc ˘ní Banka’s lending policies, see Snyder and
Kormendi (1997).  Desai (1996) provides a more general critique of
the Czech banking system’s performance and of the government’s
role as majority owner.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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spending collapsed.  By 1991, about half the com-
m e rcial banks’ loans could be classiﬁed as nonper-
forming (Meyendorff and Snyd e r, 1997), and, by
1993, the two largest commercial banks we re techni-
cally insolvent (Bartlett, 1997, p. 208), necessitating a
series of loan consolidation pro g rams and bank re ﬁ-
nancings by the sta t e. 
Hungary priva t i zed its banking sector primarily
by means of sales to fo reign strategic inve s to rs who
assumed operating control and could inject addi-
tional funds into the banks. Bank priva t i zation wa s
d e l ayed by uncertainty about the value of the banks’
p o r t folios and their franchise va l u e, but, by the end of
1997, the process was largely complete. The nota b l e
exceptions we re Hungary’s two largest commerc i a l
b a n k s, OTP and Po s tabank; the latter re q u i red a major
g overnment bailout in 1998. The gove r n m e n t ’s
l i b e ral policy towa rd the entry of fo reign banks into
Hungary spurred greater competition and improve d
the efﬁc i e n cy of the banking system. Neve r t h e l e s s,
during the transition period, Hungarian commerc i a l
banks we re not effective means of channeling
s avings to the corporate secto r. Indeed, in part
because of the draconian nature of Hungarian bank-
r u p tcy laws and in part due to the needto improve
their balance sheets, most commercial banks in Hun-
gary reduced their ex p o s u re to Hungarian ﬁrms in
favor of investments in government securities. 
Poland
The socialist banking system in Poland was dis-
mantled in 1989.  Four state banks, specialized 
in fo reign tra d e, household deposits, etc., we re
c o n verted into commercial banks.  Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the
National Bank of Po l a n d ’s (NBP’s) regional ofﬁc e s
we re converted into nine commercial banks, each
with a network of ofﬁces and a client base that wa s
c o n c e n t rated in that region (Slay, 1996).  Early on,
due to lax supervision and easy-entry conditions, a
number of small new banks as well as some fo re i g n -
owned banks we re founded.  Many of these new
banks succumbed either to scandal or to their
inability to survive poor ﬁnancial re s u l t s.  Subse-
q u e n t l y, regulations re g a rding the founding of new
banks we re toughened. 
The government continued as the owner of the
l a rge new commercial banks for some time.  This wa s
due to delays in implementing their priva t i za t i o n
t h rough a pro g ram that invo l ved sales of stock to a
combination of domestic ow n e rs and fo reign stra t e g i c
i n ve s to rs (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997).  The gove r n-
ment also changed the structure of the industry by
consolidating some commercial banks to incre a s e
their size and thus make them more competitive with
fo reign banks (Bonin and Leven, 1996).  This wa s
m o t i vated by the fact that Poland, like the other two
c o u n t r i e s, soon will have to re m ove barriers to the
entry of banks from EU countries.
Despite the regional orientation of nine of the
c o m m e rcial banks—which limits the extent to which
t h ey compete with each other and encourages local
authorities to press these banks to lend to local ﬁr m s
— o b s e r ve rs believe that Polish banks have been re l a-
t i vely successful in cutting ties to unpro ﬁtable ﬁr m s
while avoiding a major dive rsion of lending from cor-
p o rate clients to government securities.  The fact that
economic growth resumed in Poland sooner and
m o re vigorously than it did in the Czech Re p u b l i c
and in Hungary explains some of this more suc-
cessful performance of Polish commercial banks. 
Summary
All three of the transition economies have made
p ro g ress in creating a banking system that corre s -
ponds to the needs of a developed market economy.
Their central banks have considerable independence
f rom government inﬂuence in fo l l owing their man-
dates to control inﬂation and maintain the inter-
national value of their curre n cy.  At the same time,
the commercial banking sector remains re l a t i ve l y
f ra g i l e, plagued by poor loans made in the past as
well as by questionable lending policies that, fo r
some banks, continue to the present.  These pro b l e m s
a re most visible in the Czech Re p u b l i c, but even in
Poland and Hungary loan portfolios of individual com-
m e rcial banks remain pro b l e m a t i c.  This weakness of
the commercial bank secto r, and its re l a t i vely small
role in ﬁnancing the investment activity of the corpo-
rate secto r, limits the policies that central banks can
fo l l ow and may attenuate or distort the tra n s m i s s i o n
of monetary policy impulses to the economy.
The problems created by the fragility of the
commercial bank sector are exacerbated by the
underdevelopment of the other components of 
the capital market.  Each of the countries has a
stock exchange, but markets for shares are thin,
and stock markets have performed poorly since
the middle of the decade.  More importantly, these
stock markets provide few opportunities for raising
funds through initial public offerings.  Insurance
companies and mortgage lending are underdevel-
oped or remain as monopolies of the state.  The
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relative underdevelopment of the capital markets
in these countries is evident when we compare the
ﬁnancial intermediation to gross domestic product
(GDP) ratio ((bank assets + stock market capitaliza-
tion + bond market capitalization) / GDP) for the
three transition economies to the EU average.
During 1996 this ratio was 162.4 percent for the
Czech Republic, 85.9 percent for Hungary, and 63.4
percent for Poland; the corresponding ﬁgure for
the EU was 288.1 percent (Fink and Haiss, 1999).
Thus, even though modern banking and capital
market institutions exist in these countries, they
are more fragile and likely to function less
effectively than the European Union countries. 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
IN TRANSITION
Although the three countries differ in the
s tarting conditions and in the details of the policies
adopted, there are important similarities in their
a p p roach to sta b i l i zation and disinﬂation.  All thre e
began the process of transition with distorted
domestic prices, unrealistic exchange rates, and
open or repressed inﬂation.  The initial objectives
of macroeconomic policy were to contain the inﬂa-
tion that would follow from, or be intensiﬁed by,
the freeing of domestic prices.  To make stabiliza-
tion credible, to facilitate the reorientation of trade
to the West, and to underpin a liberal trade regime,
nominal exchange rates were set at rates well
below purchasing power parity (Halpern and
Wyplosz, 1997).  Policymakers expected that
domestic inﬂation would cause real exchange-
rate appreciation and lead to more realistic
exchange rates as these countries came closer 
to joining the EU. 
All three countries experienced a signiﬁcant
decline in production at the outset (Figure 1) as a
result of the collapse of CMEA trade.  This placed 
a serious burden on ﬁscal policy because tax
revenues declined and the need for a social safety
net for the swelling numbers of unemployed
increased.  Monetary policy was complicated by 
the fact that investment in plant and equipment
decreased as excess capacity emerged in many
industries.  Many ﬁrms failed to respond to the new
environment by reducing or altering their output.
Instead they accumulated large stocks of inve n to r i e s
and corresponding debts that threatened not only
their liquidity but also that of their suppliers and of
the newly created commercial banks. 
O ver time, output re c ove red and inﬂation declined
( F i g u re 2).  Neve r t h e l e s s, this decline has not bro u g h t
i n ﬂation in these countries to West European leve l s.
T h u s, the current task of monetary policy is to re d u c e
i n ﬂation in these countries with moderate levels of
i n ﬂation (Cotta relli and Sza p a r y, 1998) to low single-
digit levels so that they may pre p a re for entry into
the EU.  To achieve such disinﬂation is crucial as it is
an important pre requisite for joining the EU.  Ye t ,
tight monetary policy will hamper the ability of the
ﬁrms in these countries to underta ke the inve s t m e n t s
in new equipment and technology that are needed if
t h ey are to be competitive on EU marke t s. 
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Czech Republic
The Czech Republic employed a monetary policy
based on preserving the nominal exchange rate of
the koruna, which was pegged from 1991 to May
1997 to a basket made up of the U.S. dollar and the
Deutschmark (DM).  The objective of pegging was to
help ﬁght inﬂation by ﬁxing the prices of fo re i g n
g o o d s, to make sta b i l i zation policies cre d i b l e, and to
a t t ract fo reign capital.  The peg undervalued the
koruna to allow a period of real appreciation as the
domestic inﬂation rate outpaced that of Germany
and the United Sta t e s. 
The Czech Republic was able to satisfy three of
the four conditions proposed by Williamson (1991 )
for a successful exc h a n g e - rate peg.  It was an open
e c o n o my; it pegged to the appropriate curre n c i e s
because Germany was its main trading partner, and
fuel and many raw material imports we re priced in
U.S. dollars.  Also, its external indebtedness was low
and the ofﬁcial government budget ﬂu c t u a t e d
b e t ween surpluses and deﬁcits that we re not more
than 2 percent of GDP, giving it a credible policy
re g i m e.  Unfo r t u n a t e l y, the Czech Republic did not
satisfy the fourth criterion, that of achieving a rate of
i n ﬂation close to those of the United States and Ger-
m a ny.  As Figure 2 shows, the initial surge of price
i n c reases that fo l l owed market libera l i zation quickly
subsided, but inﬂation persisted around 10 perc e n t
for the entire transition period.2
Fiscal policy was underutilized as a policy tool to
a c h i eve a lower inﬂation ra t e, and the ﬁscal surplus
turned to a deﬁcit over the ye a rs, especially if one
c o n s i d e rs off-budget ex p e n d i t u res and commitments.
C o n s e q u e n t l y, monetary policy had to become
i n c reasingly tight to reduce the rate of inﬂation.  
At ﬁrst, the CNB relied on credit re ﬁnancing quota s
and other re l a t i vely direct measures to control the
supply of money, although, in general, money - g row t h
ta rg e t s we re ove rshot.  Over time, more indirect mea-
s u re s, including changes in the re s e r ve ratio, the
short-term repo ra t e, and open-market opera t i o n s
became the key tools for controlling the money
supply (Koch, 1997). 
One sign of the tightening of monetary policy
was the increase in nominal interest rates even as
i n ﬂation declined and then held steady.  In part, this
suited the CNB because high interest rates not only
s e r ved to deﬂate the economy, but also boosted com-
m e rcial banks’ pro ﬁt s, thus helping them to improve
their capital positions.  These high domestic intere s t
ra t e s, combined with an exc h a n g e - rate peg that wa s
c redible to fo re i g n e rs, attracted large inﬂows of
fo reign capital.  In part, such inﬂows we re the re s u l t
of borrowing by Czech ﬁrms abroad, which, of
c o u rs e, exposed them to danger if the koruna we re
ever devalued.  The bulk of capital inﬂows consisted
of short-term portfolio investments driven by the
d i f f e rential between Czech and West Euro p e a n
i n t e rest ra t e s.  Because the koruna appeared to be
u n d e r valued, inve s to rs saw little danger of its deva l-
uation and took adva n tage of the higher intere s t
rates in the Czech Re p u b l i c.  As a result of this mis-
m a tch between the credibility of the ko r u n a ’s peg
and the high interest rates maintained by the CNB,
short-term capital inﬂows began in 1993 and accel-
e rated.  By 1996, the surplus on the capital account
was sufﬁcient to more than offset a current account
d e ﬁcit that was in excess of 8 percent of GDP.  The
CNB engaged in massive, and costly, sterilization of
these capital inﬂows.
To reduce capital inﬂows, on February 28, 1996,
the CNB widened the intervention bands for the
koruna from ±0.5 percent to ±7.5 percent.  At ﬁrs t ,
this led to capital outﬂows and depreciation of the
koruna within the widened band (Jílek and Jílkov á ,
1998), but the koruna sta b i l i zed quickly, and the CNB
raised interest ra t e s, resulting in a re n ewal of capita l
i n ﬂows and a nominal appreciation of the ko r u n a
t h rough February of 1997.  On May 13, 1997, a
s p e cu l a t i ve attack on the koruna began.  This atta c k
was brought about by political uncertainty over the
fate of the Klaus government, by concerns about the
C zech Re p u b l i c ’s trade deﬁcit and the fa i l u re of
exports and output to grow, and by the inability of
the government to use ﬁscal policy to address these
f u n d a m e n tal problems (Begg, 1997, Brada and Ku ta n ,
1999).  The CNB intervened in the fo reign exc h a n g e
m a r ket to defend the koruna.  It expended about $2.5
billion in re s e r ves during this episode, and short-term
i n t e rest rates rose to 50 percent.  Neve r t h e l e s s, by
M ay 26, 1997, the Bank was fo rced to acknow l e d g e
the end of the ko r u n a ’s peg.  The government, ra t h e r
b e l a t e d l y, adopted a much more re s t r i c t i ve ﬁs c a l
p o l i cy to sta b i l i ze the situation.  The koruna initially
fell by 12 percent, but, during the ﬁrst half of 1998,
much of this loss was regained, due partly to improve d
t rade performance and partly to the persistence of
high interest ra t e s. 
With the abandonment of the nominal exc h a n g e
rate as its ta rget, the CNB at ﬁrst proposed to fo l l ow a
2 The upsurge in inﬂation in 1993 was due, in large part, to the intro-
duction of the value-added tax.36  MA RC H/ AP R I L 2 0 0 0
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policy of informally pegging to the DM, but, in
December 1998, the Bank announced a policy of
i n ﬂation ta rgeting.  The inﬂation ta rget is set in terms
of net inﬂation, a measure that excludes move m e n t s
in regulated prices, which have been increasing quite
rapidly during recent ye a rs, and the effects of indire c t
ta xes and the elimination of subsidies.  The Bank set
both a “c o n t rol” ta rget of 5.5-6.5 percent for the end
of 1998 and a thre e - year ta rget of 3.5-5.5 percent by
the end of 2000 (Czech National Bank, 1998).
Hungary
Unlike the Czech Republic, which entered the
transition with a low rate of inﬂation, Hungarian
prices rose by about 15 percent in 1987 and 1988
and by nearly 30 percent in 1989, largely because
of the ongoing liberalization of the Hungarian
economy.  As a result of this gradual liberalization,
Hungarian consumer prices better reﬂected supply
and demand and, consequently, the effects of a fur-
ther freeing of prices in 1991 led to a relatively
moderate upsurge in inﬂation (Figure 2). 
Hungary initially followed a gradualist macro-
economic policy that sought to balance the desire fo r
reducing inﬂation with the need to control the gov-
ernment deﬁcit and to service a large external debt.
Too sharp a deﬂation would have reduced govern-
ment revenues and increased expenditures on the
social safety net, thus increasing the governments
need to borrow abroad.  Hungary adopted a ﬁxed peg,
with a number of small adjustments implemented
during each year to account for the inﬂation differ-
ential between Hungary and the countries in its
re f e rence baske t .3 During the early 1990s, exc h a n g e -
rate-policy aimed at a real appreciation of the fo r i n t
to help combat domestic inﬂation, but, over time, this
p o l i cy was seen as too costly because the declining
c o m p e t i t i veness of Hungarian exports and sluggish
g rowth.  More over it failed to provide a nominal
exc h a n g e - rate anchor for inﬂationary ex p e c ta t i o n s.
These costs began to show during 1993 when
the current account deﬁcit reached 9 percent of
GDP and then increased to 9.6 percent the fo l l ow i n g
year. At the same time, the government’s budget
deficit remained unacceptably high.4 F i n a n c i n g
this deficit re q u i red monetary expansion as we l l
as high interest rates to attract commercial banks
to government securities, thus fueling the infla-
tion that the strong forint policy had sought to
re d u c e.  The persistence of these twin deficits 
c reated uncertainty among Hungary’s fo re i g n
c re d i to rs as well as concerns about the stability of
the forint. 
In March of 1995, the Hungarian gove r n m e n t
adopted a major sta b i l i zation pro g ram that included
a sharp reduction in government ex p e n d i t u res as
well as tax incre a s e s.  These reduced the ﬁscal deﬁc i t
f rom 9.6 percent of GDP in 1994 to 7.3 percent in
1995 and 4.6 percent in 1996.5 The forint wa s
d evalued during the ﬁrst two months of the year and
again just prior to the introduction of the sta b i l i za t i o n
p a c ka g e.  A crawling peg exc h a n g e - rate regime wa s
announced.  The initial rate of devaluation was 1.9
p e rcent per month, falling to 1.3 percent for the
second half of 1995 and declining further there a f t e r
(see Szapáry and Jaka b, 1998, Table 3).  The deva l u a-
tion of the forint, combined with the slackening of
domestic demand caused by ﬁscal stringency, stimu-
lated ex p o r t s, and, with the help of a tempora r y
import surc h a rg e, reduced imports.  As a result, the
c u r rent account deﬁcit as a perc e n tage of GDP fell
f rom 9.4 percent in 1994 to 5.6 percent in 1995 and
2.2 percent in 1997.  To slow the growth of wa g e s
and to free energy prices, the government also
adopted measures to accelerate priva t i za t i o n .6 T h e
rate of devaluation, preannounced in the craw l i n g
peg regime through 1998, served as a more effective
nominal anchor for monetary policy than had the
p revious re g i m e.  It also served to reduce speculation
and the timing of fo reign exchange transactions to
anticipate devaluation.  Like the Czech Re p u b l i c,
Hungary sterilized some of the inﬂows of short-term
fo reign capital as interest rates rose during the post-
s ta b i l i zation period, but in smaller amounts and at
l ower costs (Szapáry and Jaka b, 1998, pp. 70 6 - 714). 
As Figure 1 shows, economic growth slowed as
the result of these measure s, but it soon resumed 
and then accelerated.  This growth has stra i n e d
s o m ewhat the macroeconomic balance, and the cur-
rent account deﬁcit increased to 4.2 percent of GDP
during 1998 while the ﬁscal deﬁcit rose to 4.6
3 Between December 9, 1991, and May 16, 1994, the forint was pegged
to a basket of 50 percent U.S. dollar and 50 percent ECU; from there-
after until March 16, 1995, it was pegged to 30 percent U.S. dollar and 70
p e rcent ECU.
4 The government deﬁcit, including privatization receipts in revenue,
was 6.7 percent in 1993 and 9.6 percent in 1994 on an accrual basis. 
5 For the background on the discussions leading up to the design and
adoption of the stabilization program, see Kornai (1997, Chs. 2-6)
6 Real wages fell by 12.0 percent during 1995 along with a further 
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p e rcent of GDP.  Inﬂation has declined steadily, in
part due to falling prices of imports and also because
of the fo r i n t ’s slowing rate of depreciation. 
Poland
The sta b i l i zation of the Polish economy began
under much less favo rable conditions than those
found in the Czech Republic and Hungary.  During
1989, inﬂation peaked at 54.8 percent per month,
the government deﬁcit was nearly 8 percent of GDP,
and both loss-making Polish ﬁrms and the gove r n -
ment deﬁcit we re ﬁnanced by the rapid expansion of
m o n ey and credit.  Although the government began
to deal with the crisis in late 1989, major sta b i l i za t i o n
began on January 1, 1990, with the introduction of
the so-called Balcerowicz Plan.  This plan had seve ra l
c o m p o n e n t s.  The zloty (zl) was devalued from 5,560
zl/$ to 9,500 zl/$ and pegged at the latter ra t e.  Mone-
tary and ﬁscal policies we re tightened, enabling the
g overnment to achieve a surplus equivalent to 0.4 per-
cent of GDP, and credit creation was sharply curta i l e d .7
The p o p i we k, a punitive tax on above - ave rage wa g e
i n c re a s e s, was enacted to slow the growth of wa g e s. 
The consequences of this, the ﬁrst sta b i l i za t i o n
and libera l i zation effort in a transition economy, we re
s u f ﬁciently virulent—both in the upsurge in prices
and in the decline of pro d u c t i o n — to lead to an easing
of macroeconomic policy late in 1990.  The effects of
this policy change, howeve r, we re felt more in an
a c c e l e ration of inﬂation than in real output grow t h
( Wellisz, 1997), and the government soon abandoned
this effort.  As the recession deepened during 1991 ,
the ﬁscal deﬁcit re a p p e a red and high inﬂation (see
F i g u re 2) reduced the competitiveness of Po l i s h
ex p o r t s.  The zloty was devalued by 16.8  percent, 
and its peg was shifted to a basket of curre n c i e s.
Po l i cy priorities gradually shifted from sta b i l i za-
tion to stimulating growth (Krzak, 1996).  Although
the ﬁscal deﬁcit was cut from 6 percent of GDP in
1992 to 2.8 percent in 1993, a level around which it
has ﬂuctuated since, monetary policy was re l a t i ve l y
ex p a n s i o n a r y.  While interest rates remained positive,
m o n ey supply and credit growth consistently out-
paced ta rgets set by the NBP.  The zloty’s peg wa s
abandoned in October of 1991, replaced by a craw -
ling peg with a preannounced devaluation of 1.8
p e rcent per month against a basket of curre n c i e s.
O ver time, the rate of depreciation has been re d u c e d ,
and there also have been one-off devaluations and
revaluations to accommodate exogenous shocks.8
During 1995, the band within which the zloty could
ﬂuctuate was widened to ±7 percent.  Po l a n d ’s
exchange rate policy was sufﬁciently credible to fo r-
eign inve s to rs that short-term capital inﬂows began
to be a problem for the NBP by 1995, when, eve n
with some NBP sterilization, capital inﬂows accounted
for 59 percent of the growth of the money supply
( K r zak, 1996, p. 57).
Although Poland has had the highest rate of inﬂa-
t i o n of the three countries throughout the 1990s, it also
has had the fastest growth of aggregate output.  This
m ay be due as much to its earlier start in implementing
economic re forms as to better economic policy; just
as its higher rate of inﬂation may better re ﬂect its
p re s ta b i l i zation situation rather than a poorer ability to
re s t rain the growth of the money supply than displaye d
by the other two countries considered in this paper.
Re c e n t l y, this output growth has slowed somew h a t
because of a fall in exports to Russia and the Ukra i n e,
which is due to the ﬁnancial crises in those countries.
Because inﬂation has s l a c kened and because the
nominal anchor of the crawling peg has decreased in
i m p o r ta n c e with a further widening of the bands,
Poland, like the Czech Re p u b l i c, has adopted inﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting as the fra m ework for its monetary policy.
During 1998, the Monetary Po l i cy Council set a goal
of lowering Polish inﬂation to 6.8-7.8 percent in 1999
and 4 percent as measured by the CPI, by the year 2003.
Lessons and Their Implications for 
Monetary Policy
All three countries have sta b i l i zed inﬂation at
m o d e rate levels and, except for the recent re c e s s i o n
in the Czech Re p u b l i c, succeeded in generating sus-
tained growth.  Although different initial conditions
and the different starting times of sta b i l i zation pro -
g rams resulted in somewhat different paths, the
t ra j e c tories of their growth and inﬂation have con-
ve rged.  Indeed, by the second half of 1998, inﬂa t i o n
seemed to be falling towa rd single-digit levels in the
t h ree countries.  In the Czech Re p u b l i c, the monthly
ye a r - o n - year rate of inﬂation as measured by the CPI
fell to 6.8 percent in December 1998.  In Hungary,
the comparable ﬁg u re was 10.5 percent, and in Po l a n d
it was 8.6 percent.  These harbingers of the end of
double-digit inﬂation we re accurate only for the
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C zech Republic where, during the ﬁrst half of 1999,
the CPI grew between 1 and 2 percent on a month-
on-month basis.  In Hungary, inﬂation accelera t e d
and exceeded 10 percent by summer’s end.  Po l i s h
CPI growth increased on a month-on-month basis,
raising doubts about whether the NBP’s inﬂation ta r-
gets for the year will be achieved. 
Whether the three countries can continue with
the process of disinﬂation and achieve West Euro -
pean rates of CPI growth during the next few ye a rs
depends on three fa c to rs.  The ﬁrst and most impor-
tant of these is whether they can continue to support
m o n e tary policy with the appropriate ﬁscal policy.
The instances in which ﬁscal policy was tightened 
in these three countries—Poland in 1993, the Cze c h
Republic in 1997, and Hungary in 1995—amply
d e m o ns t rate the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy in inﬂu-
encing both the domestic economy and exports and
i m p o r t s. Also evident in all three countries is a
t e n d e n cy for passive ﬁscal policy to lead to gra d u a l l y
l a rger ﬁscal deﬁc i t s.  The second fa c tor inﬂu e n c i n g
the course of inﬂation in the region is the international
e n v i ronment.  All three countries beneﬁted gre a t l y
f rom the fall in the prices of imports, particularly
those of fuels and raw materials.  Agricultural prices
h ave also been stable due to good harvests and cheap
imports from the EU.  During early 1998, all thre e
countries also beneﬁted from the general strength, 
if not the actual appreciation, of their curre n c i e s.
This trend reve rsed itself during late 1998 as oil
prices began to increase and as the currencies of 
all three countries we a kened, setting the stage fo r
higher import prices to feed through to the domestic
price level. 
The third fa c tor inﬂuencing the course of inﬂa -
tion in the Czech Republic and Poland is whether a
n ew approach to monetary policy based on inﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting will be effective.  The belief of both the CNB
and the NBP is that, if inﬂation ta rgeting can be made
c re d i b l e, then much of the persistence of past inﬂa -
tion on inﬂationary ex p e c tations will be reduced as
c e n t ral bank credibility is strengthened and as inﬂa-
tionary ex p e c tations become more fo r wa rd looking
rather than backwa rd looking. 
The success of inﬂation ta rgeting in the Cze c h
Republic and Poland depends on whether the centra l
banks of these countries have the policy auto n o my
to carry out a policy of inﬂation ta rgeting and whe-
ther the institutional and policy environment is
c o n d u c i ve to doing so.  To begin with, it is unclear
what either the CNB or the NBP mean by inﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting.  For exa m p l e, McDonough (1997) arg u e s
that inﬂation ta rgeting means that the central bank 
h a s only one objective, the future price level, to the
exc l u s i o n of other nominal and real ta rgets such as
e m p l oyment or the level of aggregate output.  This may
be something of an ex t reme view, as Masson et al.
(1997) ta ke inﬂation ta rgeting to mean that the centra l
bank has inﬂation as the “explicit goal” (p. 6) and that
this goal “ta kes precedence over all other objective s ”
(p.9). Dittmar et al. (1999) ta ke a seemingly even more
p e r m i s s i ve view, claiming that inﬂation ta rg e t i n g
means that the “…central bank…focuses on inﬂa t i o n
but also cares about…employment, output grow t h … . ”
The issue of what the central banks mean by inﬂa t i o n
ta rgeting is not academic, because Dittmar et al.
s h ow that the consequences of including additional
goals can be quite costly in terms of the variability of
i n ﬂation, especially when measured over longer
p e r i o d s.  Neither the CNB nor the NBP have made
much of an effort to indicate precisely what they
mean by inﬂation ta rgeting.  Such lack of clarity may
p rovide the banks with a measure of ﬂexibility in set-
ting goals and objective s, but it does little to make the
p rocess of setting monetary policy more credible or
t ra n s p a rent. Thus, the lack of clarity may defeat a
primary purpose of having an inﬂation ta rget, that 
i s, helping people form more accurate ex p e c ta t i o n s
of inﬂa t i o n .
I n ﬂation ta rgeting is viewed as having importa n t
a d va n tages over other forms of monetary policy.
F i rst, it provides a nominal anchor, the price level, fo r
m o n e tary policy.  Second, inﬂation ta rgeting implies
a tra n s p a rent policy ta rget, one that both the public
and the government can unders tand and observe.
This leads to the third adva n ta g e, namely that the
c e n t ral bank’s accountability is increased, and to the
extent that the bank meets its goals, its credibility is
i n c reased as well. 
Masson et al. (1997), howeve r, argue that there
a re important pre requisites that must be met if inﬂa-
tion ta rgeting is to be lead to low and stable inﬂa t i o n .
The ﬁrst of these is central bank independence.  D e
j u re, the operational independence of the CNB and
the NBP is on a par with that of the industrialize d
countries that use inﬂation ta rgeting.  This is less so,
h oweve r, in the case of goals to be pursued. Fo r
exa m p l e, the CNB was criticized widely for main-
taining high interest rates during 1998, perhaps 
as the result of a backwa rd-looking approach to
i n t e rest rate determination, but such criticism of 
tactics need not be seen as an infringement on the
C N B ’s independence.  More troubling is that during
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l e a d e rs of the two major parties met with the gov -
ernor of the CNB and criticized him for the Bank’s
fa i l u re to pay sufﬁcient attention to employment and
output in its policy decisions.  In Poland, the Bank is
concerned not only about the inﬂation ta rget, but
also the nominal exchange ra t e.  This is due larg e l y
to considerations surrounding Po l a n d ’s pro s p e c t i ve
entry into the EU.
A second pre requisite is that there be no ﬁs c a l
d o m i n a n c e, meaning that the central bank’s policy
not be dictated by the need to ﬁnance the ﬁscal deﬁc i t
of the government.  Again, de jure, both countries
h ave safeguards against the central bank being fo rc e d
to ﬁnance the government.  Neve r t h e l e s s, in re a l i t y —
and especially if we consider the banking system as a
whole—this becomes a troublesome issue.  In Po l a n d ,
the seignorage to GDP ratio has been re l a t i vely high
by international sta n d a rd s.  In the Czech Re p u b l i c,
c o m m e rcial banks do not re c e i ve interest on re q u i re d
re s e r ve s, another form of revenue for the gove r n m e n t .
As mentioned above, the commercial banking sector in
both countries has tended to have a healthy appetite
for government debt at the expense of lending to the
business secto r.  Thus the de jure ability of the centra l
banks to avoid having to ﬁnance the government may
be subverted by the commercial banks’ evident will-
ingness to do so. 
F i n a l l y, central banks fo l l owing an inﬂa t i o n -
ta rgeting policy should avoid other nominal ta rg e t s.
In the case of Poland, the intervention bands for the
zloty are quite wide, but, as mentioned above, the
z l o t y ’s exchange rate continues to be pegged to the
U.S. dollar and to the Euro.  The Czech Re p u b l i c ’s
koruna ofﬁcially ﬂo a t s, but it is quite possible that
the CNB maintains an informal peg to the DM and
i n t e r venes in the market to support this unsta t e d
p e g . T h u s, both central banks may well face conﬂi c t s
b e t ween alternative nominal goals in the future.
It is too early to pass judgment on the
e f f e c t i veness of inﬂation ta rgeting in the 
t wo countries.  During the ﬁrst half of 1999, 
i n ﬂation in the Czech Republic was below the
ta rget ra n g e, largely due to the recession fro m
which the country is re c overing very slow l y.  In
Poland the inﬂation during mid-1999 was at or
a b ove the upper limit of the NBP's forecast.  These
potential fa i l u res to achieve inﬂation goals do not
mean that inﬂation ta rgeting cannot be a wo r ka b l e
p o l i cy regime in the longer term.  Neve r t h e l e s s,
t h e re is a danger that either undershooting and
ove rshooting inﬂation ta rgets may convince the
population that their central banks have little
impact on the rate of inﬂation, thus undermining
p o l i cy cre d i b i l i t y.
CONCLUSIONS
The Czech Re p u b l i c, Hungary and Poland have
made considerable pro g ress in stabilizing and libera l-
izing their economies.  Monetary policy has made a
s i g n i ﬁcant contribution to sta b i l i zation and there has
been a re m a r kable development in these countries’
ﬁnancial institutions and marke t s.  Neve r t h e l e s s, the
re l a t i ve newness and fragility of these markets and
institutions is of concern because of the heav y
b u rden placed on monetary authorities battling to
reduce inﬂation.  It will be important to continue to
s t rengthen the capital market in these countries and
to provide more active ﬁscal policy support for mon-
e tary policy.
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